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This thesis analyzes the similarities and unique conditions that have made the FATA and 
Kabylia safe havens for transnational terrorist groups. The thesis uses five variables to 
compare the cases: geography, governance, society, security, and outside influences on 
both areas.  
The thesis finds that geography has a strong influence on the creation of safe 
havens, particularly terrain that is difficult to access, as does weak federal governance 
and strong tribal societies. Furthermore, both Kabylia and the FATA have suffered 
chronic instability, which has provided opportunities for terrorists to establish safe 
havens. External influences have also played an important role in both areas by creating 
competing loyalties that have weakened the legitimacy of the federal government in the 
area, thus helping to create favorable conditions for terrorist safe havens. Socioeconomic 
conditions were not a consistent cause of safe havens in this study, nor was the presence 
of international borders.  
These findings suggest that improving communications infrastructure in places 
like the FATA and Kabylia is an important first step in making these areas less hospitable 
to terrorist organizations, as is improved infrastructure, especially roads that grant access 
to security forces in these areas. 
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A. INTRODUCTION  
Although not a new problem, safe havens—places where terrorists can organize 
and train within sovereign countries—have become a critical concern in the fight against 
terrorism in general, and transnational terrorists in particular, especially following the 
9/11 attacks. Areas with strong tribal societies and weak central governments appear to 
be the type of territory in particular that terrorists have used for sanctuary. One such 
place, which has received considerable attention, especially post 9/11, is the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The FATA provided sanctuary to foreign 
terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, as well as having created indigenous terrorist 
groups like the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistani Major General Hayaud Din 
argues, “The FATA is an anomaly that does not exist anywhere else in the world.”1  
Although the FATA has been singled out as a particularly unique and ripe area for 
terrorist sanctuary, it is not unique. A similar area exists in Algeria, known as Kabylia. 
Both the FATA and Kabylia have strong tribal societies and house transnational terrorist 
organizations linked to Al Qaeda. In this study, we compare these locations with the goal 
of finding those similarities and differences that contribute to promoting terrorism, and of 
discovering possible means of mitigating their role as safe havens for transnational 
terrorist groups.  
B. THE FATA PROBLEM 
The FATA has a long history of turmoil, conflict, and power politics. This area 
was a prime focus for the British during colonization. During their rule over the FATA, 
the British could not enforce their writ upon the tribal area. Exhausted by repeated battles 
with the tribes, the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901 (FCR) was introduced in an effort  
 
                                                 
1 Muhammad Hayaud Din, "The Frontier Problem," Military Digest-General Headquarters 
Rawalpindi, 1954, 1. 
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to subdue them, which consisted of a special governing system for the tribal region only. 
Political agents (PAs) and the maliki system were also developed to allow greater 
colonial control.2  
The FATA was of great strategic importance, particularly when the Russian 
Empire and British India were rivals in the “Great Game” (1813 to 1989), a term used to 
describe the strategic rivalry and conflict between these empires for supremacy in Central 
Asia. The British feared that Afghanistan would become a staging ground for a Russian 
invasion of India and that the Tsar’s troops would subdue the Central Asian Khanates 
(Khiva, Bokhara, Khokand) one after another, in effect flanking the British presence in 
South Asia. Britain fought several wars with Russia to maintain her presence in the area, 
and the FATA became a critical buffer zone between the two great powers. 
The FATA became an area of critical importance once again when the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Initially, this area was the battleground for hostile 
intelligence operations, and then housed bases that supported the mujahedeen’s fight 
against the Soviets. Islamic religious extremism was preached in the area to recruit 
mujahedeen to fight the Soviets. This message of jihad against the infidels persisted 
beyond the war, radicalizing a generation of Pashtun refugees and helping to create the 
Taliban.  
The FATA once again became an area of critical importance following the 9/11 
attacks on the United States. According to FATA expert Sabina Khan, “the FATA is the 
epicenter of the ‘War on Terror.’”3 Today, the FATA is an area of concern not only for 
Pakistan, but the international community as well. The region has promoted terrorism 
through the spread of militant ideologies and has provided havens to terrorists. Following 
9/11, the FATA and some parts of the adjacent Khyberpakhtunkhaw (KP) have gradually 
continued to slip out of Pakistan’s control, to such an extent that militants routinely hit 
                                                 
2Sabina Khan, "FATA's Political Status," Strategic Insights 10, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 35-46. 
3 Ibid., 35. 
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NATO supply lines and storage depots in Peshawar, the capital of KP, forcing the United 
States and NATO to consider other, more expensive, logistics routes.4  
These conditions have prompted international actors, particularly the United 
States, to demand that Pakistan take further action to control this part of their country. 
Pakistan launched military operations in the FATA beginning in 2002, but has been 
unable to bring the area under full control. The United States has used drone attacks in 
the FATA to target terrorist houses and individuals, straining relations with Pakistan. 
Despite these efforts, the FATA remains relatively autonomous and the presence of 
domestic and transnational terrorist groups persists.  
C. THE KABYLIA: ALGERIA’S “FATA”? 
The Algerian Kabylia has many similarities with the Pakistani FATA. Partially 
controlled by the Algerian government, the Kabylia region is the main source of 
instability in Algeria. It is primarily governed through tribal structures (aarch)5, which do 
recognize neither the government’s nor Algeria’s political parties. Individuals devote 
their loyalty to the tribe rather than the central government.  Similar to the FATA, which 
is linguistically and culturally distinct from the rest of Pakistan, Kabylia also has a 
separate language, culture, and history from the rest of Algeria. Its people, the Berbers, 
are distinct from Arabs and have a longstanding belief in their unique origins, fueled in 
part by French perceptions of Berber superiority over Arabs.  
Also like the FATA, Kabylia has a strong sense of independence. Kabylia 
embraced the 1954 Algerian national revolution against French colonialism in its early 
days. Kabylians were, in fact, the pioneers of the national movement. During the 1930s, 
the Berbers in France founded the first two national political parties, the Etoile du Nord 
Africain (ENA) and Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). These two parties, despite colonial 
repression, carried the struggle for national independence. After being dissolved by the 
                                                 
4 Hassan Abbas, “ President Obama’s Policy Options in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan (FATA),” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding report (Michigan, 2009): 3-4,accessed 
May 4,2012. http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/fata_report.pdf. 
5 International Crisis Group, “Algeria: Agitation and Impasse in Kabylia,” Middle East/ North Africa  
report (Brussels, 2003). 
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French authorities, the militants of both parties formed the Orgainisation Secrete (OS), 
which turned into the hardcore Front de Liberation National (FLN), the backbone of the 
armed struggle against French occupation.  
Despite its role in fostering Algerian independence, Kabylia maintained a strong 
desire for autonomy from the rest of the country following liberation from France. In 
1963, the Algerian Popular National Army (ANP) invaded Kabylia during the armed 
revolt of Ait Ahmed Hocine, one of the engineers of the Algerian revolution. The 
aftermath of these events is very significant in the Berbers social memory. Again, in 
1980, the “Berber Spring” made clear the cultural and political demands of Kabylia, 
which had been previously largely ignored or obscured. 6 During the “Black Spring” of 
2001,7 the region witnessed violent riots, where hundreds of people lost their lives in a 
protest against the central government. The excessive use of government force led the 
Kabylian Autonomy Movement (MAK) to declare independence and form an exile 
Kabylian government in 2001.8  
Along with social unrest, terrorist organizations such as AQIM have created a 
safe haven in the Kabylia mountainous region. From its stronghold in Kabylia, AQIM is 
focusing terrorist activities around Algiers, its immediate hinterland, and the south of 
Algeria.9 Terrorist attacks by AQIM reached a peak in the years following 2003.10 AQIM 
has since created training camps and doubled its recruitment campaign within the local 
population. The presence of AQIM in Kabylia carries dangers for the national unity of 
Algeria as a whole, since it aggravates the instability of the region and undermines the 
                                                 
6Gilles Manceron and Farid Aissani. Algrie: comprendre la crise.( Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 
1996), 164.    
7 Maddy Weizman, Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States, (University 
of Texas Press, 2011), 185. 
 
8Ramdan Belamri,"Algerian Separatist Leader’s Visit to Israel Stirs Controversy," Al Aarabia, May 
22, 2012, accessed October 15, 2012. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/22/215732.html. 
9Scott Poynting, David Whyte, Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: the War on Terror as 
Terror, (Routledge, New York, 2012), 223. 
 
10Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in North, West and Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring, 
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies report (Arlington, 2012). 
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relationship of Kabylia to the Algerian nation. Moreover, it reflects the fundamental 
problem that has plagued Algeria since independence: the absence of adequate political 
institutions to represent Kabylian interests and grievances. 
D. THESIS STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
In this thesis, we examine the similarities and ideal conditions that have made the 
FATA and Kabylia safe havens for terrorist groups, particularly transnational terrorists 
affiliated with Al Qaeda.  
In particular we will explore the five critical variables that we hypothesize are 
important for understanding the conditions under which terrorist safe havens emerge: 
geography, society, governance, security, and external actors.  
Geography is important because terrain, neighboring counties, and location may 
affect the emergence of safe havens to terrorists. We hypothesize that the more 
mountainous the terrain, the greater the access to transnational borders, and the more 
unstable the neighborhood, the greater the chances that an area will become a sanctuary 
for terrorists.  
Regarding societies, we hypothesize that tribal structures are useful for terrorists 
wishing to create a sanctuary. Specifically, we will look at tribal codes of conduct and 
how they may create social conditions that allow terrorist groups to coexist among the 
population. We also hypothesize that the poorer the region and the more illiterate, the 
greater the chances that terrorists will use the area for sanctuary.  
Regarding governance, we are interested in understanding how political structures 
may create, or be unable to prevent, the presence of terrorist groups. We hypothesize that 
the weaker the rule of law and the ability to enforce it, the more likely the presence of 
terrorist groups.  
Security is a major contributor to safe haven in both areas under study. We 
hypothesize that the longer the insecurity in the area, regardless of the cause, the greater 
the chances that terrorists will use the area as a haven. We believe that chronic instability 
and lack of security creates a culture of insecurity that terrorists can exploit.  
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Finally, external actors are important to study because, as we hypothesize, 
terrorists need not only domestic support, but also external support to grow and carry out 
operations. We argue that the presence of external actors reflects weak legal and political 
institutions in an area and further weakens a government’s ability to control the territory. 
This thesis uses these five variables to analyze the FATA and Kabylia separately, through 
process tracing, and then compares them to better understand both the common and 
distinctive causes that encourage international terrorist organizations in these areas. To 
investigate this hypothesis, we use data from primary and secondary sources, including 
government proceedings such as declassified national-security briefings, press releases, and 
statements from government agencies, as well as books, journals, articles, newspapers, and 
magazines on the past and the present condition of the region.  
The thesis finds that geography has a strong influence on the creation of safe 
havens, particularly terrain that is difficult to access, as does weak federal governance, 
and strong tribalism. Both Kabylia and the FATA have had chronic instability, which has 
provided opportunities for terrorist havens. External influences have also played an 
important role in both the areas by creating competing loyalties that weaken the 
legitimacy of the federal government, helping to create conditions favorable for refuge. 
Socioeconomic conditions were not a consistent cause of safe havens in this study, nor 
were international borders. 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II uses the five critical variables 
(geography, society, governance, security, and external actors) to describe and analyze 
the FATA in Pakistan. This chapter will describe the historical background of the FATA 
since British rule and focus on the British mode of governance, their policies, and their 
on tribal people.  
Chapter III uses the same framework to analyze Algeria and the history of the 
Kabylia region, looking first at how the Ottomans shaped early society and politics in 
Algeria and then the French influence under colonial occupation. This chapter reviews 
Algeria’s bid for independence and the role that the Berbers played. It will then consider 
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Kabylia following Algerian independence, the continuing struggle for cultural, social, 
and political autonomy, and how this unrest has shaped the emergence of transnational 
terrorists in the area.  
Chapter IV summarizes the findings of this research and highlights key points.  
In Chapter V, pragmatic recommendations for strategies to oppose potential safe 
havens are proposed. 
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 9
 THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREA  II.
OF PAKISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly discusses the historical background of the FATA and gives an 
overview of its geography, administration, society, security, and international 
involvement. Since the FATA is linked to harboring terrorism, it is necessary to 
understand why the area is ideal for such activities.  
To understand the dynamics of the FATA, this chapter is divided into three parts. 
The first section discusses the historical overview of the FATA from the British colonial 
period to the present. The second section discusses the five variables of this study: the 
geographical location of the FATA and the society, people, governance, security, and 
outside influences. The third provides concluding thoughts.  
This chapter argues that the favorable conditions for promoting terrorism in the 
FATA are embedded broadly in the tribal culture and geographical location of FATA.  
B. THE HISTORY OF THE FATA  
The areas that today make up the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of 
Pakistan have been a semi-autonomous region throughout known history. Many dynasties 
ruled the area, but none succeeded in bringing the tribal people under full control. To 
understand the emergence of the FATA as an area of concern for domestic and 
international terrorism, this section highlights the pre-colonial era, British rule, Pakistan’s 
bid for independence, and the FATA before and after 9/11.  
1. The Pre-Colonial Period 
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, an area roughly 280 miles 
long and 155 miles wide, has seen the rise and fall of several ancient civilizations and 
dynasties. Nonetheless, this region has ever remained independent or autonomous.  
The earliest known migration to the region was the influx of Arians from the 
north in 1700 B.C., traversing mountain passes into the subcontinent. Recorded history 
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began with the arrival of the Persians in the 5th century B.C., who ruled the area for 
about two centuries. The Greeks, under Alexander the Great, crossed the area in 326 B.C. 
and established a satrapy (province) comprising this and adjoining areas. The Mauryan 
Empire also extended to these areas in 322 B.C. and spread Buddhism as a popular 
religion. The Greco-Bactrians occupied the area in 185 B.C., followed by the Scythians 
(Sakas) in 97 B.C. and Kushanas in the second century A.D. The Kushana’s period was 
followed by fragmented local rule until the Muslim conquest of these areas beginning in 
the eight century A.D. 
Muhammad bin Qasim11 conquered the Sindh and adjacent Multan areas in 712 
A.D. when the subcontinent was ruled by the Hindu Shahi dynasty. This was followed by 
many other Muslim sultans’ wars with the Hindus, including Mahmood Ghaznavi, 
Shahabud Din Muhammad Ghori, and Qutb-ud-Din Aibak. These sultans (1206–1525 
A.D.) confined their reign to the east of the Indus River and did not interfere in the affairs 
of the trans-Indus tribes. The Mughal Empire (1526–1857 A.D.) had political links with 
Kabul and further north, in addition to the east, and required safe passage through the 
tribal areas of the FATA. Despite frequent contact, local tribes remained hostile and 
implacable toward the Mughals. 
2. British Rule  
In the 19th century, the Sikhs sought to extend their rule to the eastern tribal areas 
after their occupation of the trans-Indus plains, but failed. Sikh rule was brought to an 
end by the British occupation of the Punjab India in 1849. When the British arrived in 
India, there was no defined border with Afghanistan. Nor were there regularly constituted 
political agencies or a demarcated tribal area between the British-administered territories 
at the foot of the FATA mountain ranges and Afghanistan to the east. The tribal area 
across the border enjoyed de facto independence and was commonly known as ghairilaqa 
                                                 
11 Muhammad bin Qasim was the military General sent by then Arab ruler of Umayyad Caliphate Al 
Hajjaj bin Yusuf, to conquer Sindh when Sindh was being ruled by Hindus. Qasim is famous for being the 
youngest General ever (age 17 years) who successfully conquered a large area of subcontinent and 
expanded the Muslim ruled area.  
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(un-administered territory) or Yaghistan (the land of rebels).12 In other words, the Indian 
frontier (the present day FATA) was regarded as standing on the administered border 
between India and Afghanistan.13 There was doubt between the Afghan kingdom and 
British India about the ownership of this tribal belt. The British had not occupied the 
Khyber Agency area and the Upper Kurram Valley. In reality, both these areas remained 
under vague Afghan rule. 
British rule in the Punjab, including Khyberpakhtunkhaw (KP) and the FATA, 
continued from 1849 to 1947. To maintain security at the FATA’s border, the British 
created a special indigenous force called the Punjab Frontier Force, which was 
amalgamated with the regular army in 1886. During the period between 1849 and 1857, 
the British sent troops against the tribesmen on seventeen occasions to consolidate their 
rule and secure the border.14  
Another means of securing the border in what is now the FATA was a policy of 
non-aggression toward tribal territories and non-interference in tribal affairs; this was 
known as the close-border policy.15 The British also repaired existing forts and 
constructed new ones along the administrative boundary, linking them by military roads. 
The people of the tribal areas were permitted to enter the British-occupied area and carry 
out trade freely, but the officers of the British government were not allowed to enter the 
tribal area.16 British military expeditions were undertaken only in response to violations 
by tribesmen.  
The British made several attempts to rule the people of the tribal belt, specifically 
the Pashtuns, but the Pashtuns violently resisted all attempts to conquer. Between 1849 
and 1908, the British conducted sixty-two military expeditions against tribes along the 
                                                 
12 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 BC-AD 1957 (London: Macmillan, 1965), 347. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15Maqbool Wazir, "The FATA Region in History," Waziristanhills, last modified 2009, accessed 
October 28, 2012, 
http://waziristanhills.com/FATA/FATAinGeneral/TheFATAregioninhistory/tabid/117/language/en-
GB/Default.aspx. 
    16Ibid. 
 12
border. As a result, strong revolt against the British engulfed the whole frontier, from 
Malakand to Waziristan, in 1897.17 
Around the turn of the 19th century, the Russian Empire began to set its sights on 
Afghanistan. In response, the British began securing the border between British India and 
Afghanistan. Interestingly, the boundaries of Afghanistan were not determined by the 
neighbors of Afghanistan and Afghanistan itself, but by the mutual consultation of 
neighbors only. At that time, the rulers of Afghanistan were very weak against their 
neighbors to the west and east; they were compelled to give recognition the borders. In 
1872, the border between Afghanistan and Iran was fixed through British arbitration. 
However, the limits of Afghan territory on the Pakistani side were determined by the 
authority of the British. Amir Sher Ali, the ruler of Afghanistan, was told by the British 
in 1877 that they did not recognize Dir District, Swat Valley, Chitral Valley, and Bajour 
as part of Afghanistan (the areas situated east of the Durand Line). 18 
The British abandoned the close-border policy in the 1890s in view of the threat 
of Russian expansion into Central Asia. Their new objective was to occupy a “scientific 
frontier” on the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line. 
                                                 
17Ghani Khan, "Origin of the Pathans," Pakhtun, accessed October 28, 2012, 
http://www.pakhtun.com/index.php/about-pashtuns/history-of-pashtuns/pashtun-history.  
18 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 425.  
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Figure 1.  The “scientific frontier” on the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line19 
This new strategy necessitated the control of mountain passes in the tribal areas to 
improve communication and set advanced military posts to secure the strategic line. To 
secure the border, the British established a working relationship with Amir Abdur-
Rehman Khan of Afghanistan, and to administer tribal areas, appointed political agents 
(PAs) and stationed scouts in strategic locations. The Durand Line was set in 1893.20 
The status of Afghanistan was confirmed as a buffer state between the two 
empires by the Anglo–Russian Convention of 190721. These developments effectively 
split the Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and British India. According to the last 
governor of the former North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Olaf Caroe, who had 
helped Sir Mortimer Durand draw the border line known as the Durand Line, 
... the agreement of 1893 did not describe the line as the boundary of India 
but as the frontier of the Afghan dominion and the line beyond which 
neither side will exercise interference. This was because the British 
                                                 
19 "Pakistan-Afghanistan," map, Google, accessed October 28, 2012, http://www.google.com/maps.  
20 Naveed Ahmed Shinwari, “Understanding FATA, Attitudes Toward Governance, Religion and 
Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas,” research report (Islamabad, Pakistan,2010), 6, 
accessed October 30, 2012, http://www.understandingfata.org/files/Understanding-FATA-Vol-IV.pdf.  
21Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was signed on August 31, 1907 in St Petersburg, Russia to bring 
weak British-Russia relations to the forefront by solidifying boundaries that identified respective control in 
Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. This agreement seemingly ended a long-standing struggle for power that 
had gone on at the expense of less-developed regions in Central Asia. 
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government did not intend to absorb the tribes into its administrative 
system, only to extend their own and exclude the Amir Ali’s authority 
from territory east and south of the line.22  
The ghairilaqa was a concern for the British, so they established a system to deal 
with the tribes of the present FATA area. According to Caroe:  
Since no part of the trans-border territory had been occupied, it was 
necessary that this should be done by the Deputy Commissioners, each 
officer with the tribes on his own border; for example up to the end of the 
British period, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar dealt with the 
important and powerful Mohmand tribe, the Kohat Deputy Commissioner 
dealt with Orakzais, the Bannu Deputy Commissioner dealt with some of 
Wazirs, Dera Ismail Khan with Sheranis and Bhittanis, and so on.23 
The fundamental problem lay in the fact that the British attempted to deal with the 
Pashtuns of the area now called Khyberpakhtunkhaw (KP) according to the standards of 
an imported European-type administration, while leaving their immediate neighbours, the 
Pashtuns of the hills, now known as FATA, in a state of undiluted tribalism. Although a 
definite border existed between the former NWFP and the tribal belt, tribal ties were 
strong on both sides of the border, and the people were neither socially nor economically 
seen as belonging to different areas.24  
The previous administrators, Mughal, Durrani, and even Sikh, had already inured 
the plains Pashtun tribes to life under occupation. They collected taxes on them and, in 
return, built some roads, forts, and even towns.25 But these changes were minimal in 
comparison with British colonialism and its complex system of judges and magistrates’ 
courts, police, lawyers, appellate courts, revenue collectors, land administrators, and 
other agents of bureaucratized government. And most difficult of all, they came armed 
with laws and regulations that had no relevance to the standards by which Pashtun society 
lived.26  
                                                 
22 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans 550 BC-AD 1957 (London: Macmillan, 1965), 382.  
23 Ibid. , 347-348. 
24 Ibid. , 346. 
25 Ibid. , 346. 
26 Ibid. ,346-347. 
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Observing the movement for freedom gaining momentum in most areas of the 
subcontinent in the 1930s and 1940s, the tribesmen and Pashtuns of NWFP united to 
demand the creation of an independent Muslim state. Pakistan became an official state in 
1947, with the support of the tribal areas.27 Following independence, the first governor 
general of Pakistan, Jinnah, ordered that all troops be withdrawn from the tribal areas.28  
Initially, the establishment of authority in the tribal area was not difficult for the 
federal government of Pakistan. The area was given the status of a semi-autonomous 
region and the administrative system established by the British was permitted to continue. 
PAs continued to administer their areas and the tribal form of justice, the jirga, was left in 
place to resolve petty as well as big issues. Tribal leaders, maliks, remained influential 
heads of their tribes.29 This form of administration and justice was separate and different 
from other areas of Pakistan, which adopted a legal code based on Western democracy. 
This decision had serious consequences and limitations, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
3. The FATA Before and After 9/11 
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan badly affected the political situation in 
the FATA. To contain Soviet expansion, the United States and its allies decided to 
support Pakistan overtly and covertly, and the FATA became the main hub of activities. 
According to Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai, the former governor of KP, 
Before 9/11 there was no problem in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Whatever 
is happening in the tribal areas today is a gradual spillover effect of the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and ensuing events. Militancy and violence 
have gradually found roots in tribal areas and are spreading toward settled 
areas of Pakistan.30  
                                                 
27 Ibid. , 346-347. 
28 Ghani Khan, "Origin of the Pathans," Pakhtun, accessed October 28, 2012, 
http://www.pakhtun.com/index.php/about-pashtuns/history-of-pashtuns/pashtun-history.  
29 Council on Foreign Relations, Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt, by Daniel Markey, report no. 36 
(New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 7-8.  
30 Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai and Rahman Khalid, "Situation in FATA: Causes, Consequences and 
the Way Forward," Policy Perspectives 6, no. 1 (January 2009).  
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Historically, it appears that the maliks kept crime low in the tribal belt through the 
norm of the joint responsibility of every member in the society. However, it must be 
borne in mind that the FATA at that time had no means of recording the crime rate, and 
these claims are difficult to verify. The authority of the maliks started to diminish in 
1980, when Islamic clerics in Afghanistan and the FATA with an extremist approach 
started to unite different tribes for jihad against the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.31 
 September 11th raised awareness and concern about activities in the FATA, 
particularly when Pakistan opted to join the world in the global war on terrorism. 
Following 9/11, the FATA began to have considerable security problems. 
“Approximately 600 influential maliks/elders, who sided with the government, were 
killed in a number of suicide attacks and bomb blasts in the area. A total of eleven 
incidents of suicide attacks, 153 IED attacks and 146 cases of kidnapping of government 
personnel occurred from March to October 2008 alone.”32  
The FATA’s security issues were not confined to the tribal areas, however. On 
average, in 2008, there was at least one suicide attack per week in Pakistan. Overall there 
were sixty-six such attacks, which killed approximately 965 people, including 651 
civilians, 159 paramilitary personnel, and 155 policemen).33 The number of all types of 
terrorist attacks, other than suicide attacks, is much greater. For example, the KP 
province witnessed 475 terrorist attacks in 2008, where 575 people were killed.34 
Although militant groups based in other parts of the country (mostly 
Punjab province) were also involved in some of these attacks, the FATA 
provided the major bulk of terrorist operations. Analyzing the 2007 
database of 26 cases of suicide attacks in Pakistan (out of a total of 61) 
where the special investigative unit of Pakistan’s Federal Investigation 
Agency (FIA) recovered crucial evidence, they concluded: “More than 
                                                 
31 "Cost of Conflict in FATA," Planning and Development Department, 15, accessed October 30, 
2012, http://fata.gov.pk/files/costconflict.pdf. 15.  
32 Ibid. , 16. 
33 Amir Mir, "Pakistan: Human Bombs Killed 80 People a Month in 2008," Middle East Transparent, 
accessed November 2, 2012, 
http://www.metransparent.com/spip.php?page=article&id_article=5113&lang=en.  
34 Javed Aziz Khan, "2008 – A Year of Suicide Attacks," The News (Islamabad, Pakistan), January 2, 
2009.  
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eighty percent of suicide bombers belong to the Mehsud tribe (residing in 
South and North Waziristan) and were aged 15 to 20.”35  
It is believed that many of the suicide attackers who struck across the Durand 
Line were trained and launched from KP and the FATA.36  
To eliminate the threat of terrorism from the FATA, the Pakistani military entered 
the region for the first time in 2002.37 Pakistan presently (2012) has 140,000 troops on 
the ground in the FATA and military operations have been conducted in six of the seven 
agencies, with the exception of North Waziristan.38 This nearly decade-long military 
operation has yielded results far from desired by the Pakistani government and the United 
States. 
The FATA has also been a problem for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. The 
area is a safe haven for anti-U.S. and -NATO terrorist groups such as the Haqqani 
Network.39 Eliminating havens for such groups is a continuing concern for U.S. and 
NATO forces. The United States is continuously following terrorists inside the FATA, 
successfully tracing and killing some of them through drone strikes.40 Under public 
pressure following the 2011 NATO strike on the Pakistani military post in Salala, the 
Pakistani government ceased to cooperate in drone operations and closed NATO supply 
routes to Afghanistan through Pakistan. The main cause of concern for Pakistan is the 
                                                 
35 Hassan Abbas,  “President Obama’s Policy Options in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan (FATA),” Institute for Social Policy and Understanding report, (Michigan, 2009), accessed July 
16, 2012, http://www.ispu.org/files/PDFs/fata_report.pdf.  
36 Tom Koenigs, “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007),”  United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Afghanistan , research report (2001), accessed November 1, 2012, 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%202007SuicideAttacks.pdf.  
37 Sabina Khan, "FATA's Political Status," Strategic Insights 10, no. 2 (Summer 2011).  
38Adam Entous and Siobhan Gorman, "U.S. Slams Pakistani Effort on Militants," The Wall Street 
Journal, (October, 2010).  
39 Erik Schmitt, "U.S. Seems Set to Brand Militant Group as ‘Terrorist’," The New York Times, August 
31, 2012, National Edition, Asia Pacific.  
40 Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, "Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004 - 2012," 
The Long War Journal, accessed November 1, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php.  
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collateral damage done by drone strikes and compromise of sovereignty.41 Nonetheless, 
drone strikes have proven effective in following and killing terrorists inside the FATA. 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE FATA’S TERRORISM PROBLEM 
To better understand the current dynamics in the FATA, this section will analyze 
five variables: geographical location and terrain; governance; the society and people; 
regional security; and outside influences.  
1.  The FATA: Geographical Location and Terrain  
The FATA covers an area of 10,507 sq. miles, which is 3% of Pakistan’s total 
territory. The FATA comprises seven administrative divisions called political agencies, 
namely, the Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan Agency 
(NWA), and South Waziristan Agency (SWA). FATA also has six frontier regions (FRs): 
Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki, Tank and Dera Ismael Khan (D.I. Khan).42 SWA is the 
largest political agency and FR D.I. Khan is the largest FR.  
                                                 
41 Huma Imtiaz, "After US Says 'Sorry' for Salala Attack, Pakistan Reopens GLOCs," The Express 
Tribune, July 3, 2012, accessed October 28, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/403075/us-says-sorry-for-
salala-attack/.  
42 The Frontier Region (FR) is small administrative unit in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA), lying immediately to the east of the seven main tribal agencies and west of the settled districts of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The FRs are geographically part of the respective agency. Each of the Frontier 
Regions is named after an adjoining settled district and is administered by the district coordination officer 
(DCO) of that adjacent district. The overall administration of the Frontier Regions is carried out by the 
FATA Secretariat based in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 
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Figure 2.  Divisions of the FATA43 
The border between the FATA and Afghanistan comprises one of the most 
formidable and ruggedly mountainous terrains in the world. Inhospitable, sparsely 
populated, and underdeveloped, it has acted as a natural barrier isolating Central Eurasia 
and South Asia, forcing invaders through a few passes, notably the Khyber Pass.44 The 
FATA is surrounded by mountain ranges that include Hindu Kush, Sufed Koh, the 
Suleiman Mountains, and the Waziristan Hills, with heights ranging from 4,500 to 11,000 
feet. Five rivers flow through the area—the Paujkara, Kabul, Bara, Kurram, and Gomal—
providing water for regional agriculture. Of the reported 2.7 million hectares of land, less 
than 8% is cultivable. About 44% of the cultivable area is irrigated, supporting 40 
persons per hectare. Except in Kurram, there is no land settlement. Land is mostly owned 
by tribes, and ownership is based on customary laws. 
  
                                                 
43 "FATA Divisions," images, Google, accessed October 28, 2012, http://www.google.com/images.  
44 Yasub Ali Dogar, "The Talibanisation of Pakistan's Western Region," Institute of South Asian 




1 Reported Area (hectares) 2722.04 
2 Cultivated Area 216.18 
3 Cultivable Waste 173.99 
4 Cultivable Area 390.17 
5 Irrigated Area 83.24 
6 Forested Area 43.18 
7 Cultivated Area as % of Reported Area 7.94% 
8 Irrigated Area as % of Cultivated Area.  38.50% 
9 Forest Area as % of Reported Area. 1.59% 
Table 1.   FATA land division45 
Geographically, three regions lie entirely within the FATA: the northern, central 
and southern regions.46 The northern region, between the Swat and Kabul rivers, contains 
the Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. The land is mostly mountainous, with deep ravines 
and limited irrigated area. The temperature and climatic conditions, however, make it 
possible to grow a variety of crops, including oil seeds, fruits, and vegetables.47 The 
central region consists of the Khyber, Kurram, and Orakzai agencies and the frontier 
regions of Kohat and Peshawar. The fertile Khanki, Masturea, and Bara River valleys lie 
in the foothills of the 4,000-meter high Safed Koh. The Kurram valley is the most 
                                                 
45 Socio-economic Indicators of FATA. FATA Figures (Islamabad: Shaheed Bhutto Foundation, 
2008), accessed November 2, 2012, http://www.sbf.org.pk/pdf/FATA-data.pdf.  
46 Sher Alam Shinwari, "The FATA Areas, So Near Yet So Far Away," Khyber Gateway, accessed 
November 2, 2012, http://www.khyber.org/pashtoplaces/fataareas.shtml.  
47 Socio-economic Indicators of FATA. FATA Figures (Islamabad: Shaheed Bhutto Foundation, 
2008), accessed November 2, 2012, http://www.sbf.org.pk/pdf/FATA-data.pdf.  
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extensively cultivated agricultural land in the FATA.48 The southern region is bound by 
the Gomal River in the south, Kurram River in the north, and Afghan border in the west. 
This region consists of North and South Waziristan and the frontier regions of D.I. Khan, 
Tank, Bannu and Lakki. Most of the area is unsuitable for agriculture and has no major 
industry. 
The mountainous region of the FATA straddles a very difficult, inhospitable, 
extremely underdeveloped, and sparsely populated terrain which is inherently difficult to 
access and govern.49 There are many remote areas where an ordinary man may not be 
able to approach, so it is hard to implement law enforcement in such areas. Generally 
terrorists find such areas favorable to live and hide in and continue with their activities; 
the FATA is no exception.  
2. The Society and People 
According to the 1998 census, the total population of the FATA is 
3.138 million.50 Bajaur is the largest political agency on the basis of population and FR 
Kohat is the largest among the FRs. The FATA is inhabited by eleven major tribes, in 







                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Shuja Nawaz, FATA-A Most Dangerous Place, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2009), 6.  











Bajaur 1290 4.74 0.595 18.7 Utmankhel & Tarkani 
Mohmand 2296 8.43 0.334 10.5 Mohmand, Safi & Utmankhel 
Khyber 2576 9.46 0.547 17.2 Afridi, Shelmani, Shinwari & Mulagori 




Orakzai 1538 5.65 0.225 7.1 Orakzai and Bangash 
North 
Waziristan 4707 17.29 0.361 11.4 
Utmanzai, Dawar, 
Saidgai, Kharasin & 
Gurbaz 
South 
Waziristan 6620 24.32 0.430 13.6 
Mahsud, Ahmadzai & 
Wazir 
FR Peshawar 261 0.96 0.054 1.7 Afridi 
FR Kohat 446 1.64 0.088 2.8 Afridi 
FR Bannu 745 2.74 0.020 0.6 Wazirs & Bhittani 
FR Lakki 132 0.48 0.007 0.1 - 
FR D.I.Khan 2008 7.38 0.039 1.2 Bhittani, Ustrana & Shirani 
FR Tank 1221 4.49 0.027 0.9 - 
Total 27220 100.0 3.138 100.0 - 
Table 2.   Details of the FATA Agencies and FRs51 
 
                                                 
51 FATA Figures (Islamabad: Shaheed Bhutto Foundation, 2008), accessed November 2, 2012, 
http://www.sbf.org.pk/pdf/FATA-data.pdf  
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The population of the FATA has increased at a rate of 2.1% per annum against the 
national growth rate of 2.69%. The male to female ratio in 1998 was 1:0.92 and the 
population density was 117 persons per square km.52  Population figures and growth rates 
for the FATA are reflected in Table 3. 
 
S. NO. Years of Census Population x1000 Increase (%) 
Growth Rate 
(%) 
1 1951 1332 - - 
2 1961 1847 38.66 3.3 
3 1972 2491 34.87 2.6 
4 1981 2199 (-) 11.72 (-) 1.5 
5 1998 3176 44.43 2.4 
6 1951–1998 - 138.44 2.1 
Table 3.   Population growth rates in the FATA53 
Comparative demographic indicators show that the average household size in 
terms of family members in the FATA is 9.3, compared to 8.0 in KP and 6.8 in 
Pakistan.54 The average per-capita income in the FATA is 2,391.00 Pakistani Rupees 
(PKR), against a per-capita income in the Pakistani mainland of 4,000.00 PKR. The 
Bajaur agency has the lowest per-capita income, of 1,045.00 PKR, mainly because of its 
highest comparative population, which is 18.7% of the total population of the FATA. The 
                                                 
52 "Population Demography," Federally Administered Tribal Areas, accessed November 1, 2012, 
http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=92.  
53 Government of Pakistan Ministry of Finance, Population, Labor Force and Employment, 
publication (2008), Table 12.5, accessed November 2, 2012, http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/12-
Population08.pdf.  
54 "Population Demography," Federally Administered Tribal Areas, accessed November 1, 2012, 
http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=92.  
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region with the highest per-capita income 5,846.00 PKR, is FR D.I. Khan, which has 
1.2% share of the total population of the FATA.55  
The main sources of income for the population are small-arms manufacturing and 
trade, limited agriculture, and jobs in other settled areas.56 Mohmand Agency has marble 
as one form of industry, and NWA has timber. One way of earning money is by 
protecting marble and timber transportation, especially in areas controlled by the 
Taliban.57 Gray and black markets are an important source of income in the FATA. As an 
expert in the FATA describes, 
Smuggled goods are big business in all seven tribal districts, and traders in 
nearly every FATA agency have defined their niche market. If one agency 
is known as a trading hub for smuggled tires, other deals exclusively in 
smuggled cars, weapons, or chemicals. Whenever the government of 
Pakistan introduces any changes in the taxation system that pushes up the 
price of any such goods or cracks down more vigorously on the illegal 
weapons trade, smuggling of these articles into Pakistan through these 
routes begins.58 
These socioeconomic factors indicate that most of the population of the FATA is 
poorer than the rest of Pakistan. It should also be noted that the per-capita income of 
mainland Pakistan, cited above, is also well below the required minimum income to 
fulfill the basic necessities of life. 
Per the 1998 census, only 17.42% of the FATA population is literate, with a male 
literacy rate of 29.51% and female rate of 3.0%. The 2005–2006 data reveals that there 
were 4,327 primary schools in the FATA (male 2,582, female 1,745) constituting 2.75% 
of the national figure. Furthermore, the FATA has 1.02% of the middle schools in 
Pakistan (402), 233 high schools, and only thirty-three degree-granting colleges. Most 
                                                 
55 FATA Figures (Islamabad: Shaheed Bhutto Foundation, 2008), accessed November 2, 2012, 
http://www.sbf.org.pk/pdf/FATA-data.pdf.  
56Ghani Khan, "Origin of the Pathans," Pakhtun, accessed October 28, 2012, 
http://www.pakhtun.com/index.php/about-pashtuns/history-of-pashtuns/pashtun-history.  
57Asif Mian, "FATA: Tribal Economy in the Context of Ongoing Militancy," PIPS Journal of Conflict 
and Peace Studies 2, no. 3 (September 2009), 3. 
58 Ibid. 
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schools lack water, electricity, and facilities and are highly understaffed.59 These 
statistics indicate that the FATA not only has very low literacy and education rates, but 
that change is unlikely, given the low number of schools.60 
The FATA has only thirty-three hospitals, thirty-three dispensaries, fifty-five 
maternal and child health centers (MCHs) and eight rural health clinics (RHCs). Infant 
mortality is estimated at 87 per thousand births and maternal mortality is 600 per 100,000 
live births, making it one of the highest areas for infant and maternal mortality in the 
country.61 
Culturally, the FATA is primarily made up of Pashtuns, a group that is 
linguistically distinct from Urdu speakers in Pakistan, with distinct cultural traits. 
Pashtuns have their own law or code of honor, called Pakhtoonwali. Social interaction is 
heavily influenced and governed by this strict tribal code, characterized by pat 
(comradeship), shegara (doing good to others), toora (bravery), wafa (fidelity to the 
word and cause), baramta (the act of taking goods or individuals hostage), and nang 
(honor). The society is also very particular about milmastia (hospitality) and badal 
(taking revenge). The Pashtuns consider their desire for independence, bravery, 
hospitality, and retaliation great features of their culture. These characteristics are thought 
to be the supports of the Pakhtoonwali.62  
Islam and the Pakhtoonwali regulate life for the Pashtuns and complement each 
other. However, Pakhtoonwali often contradicts religious practices. Some examples 
include the perpetuation of blood feuds, revenge, the practice of usury, and the refusal to 
include female members in the father’s inheritance.63 Sharia (Islamic law) is not viewed 
                                                 
59 Socio-economic Indicators of FATA. FATA Figures (Islamabad: Shaheed Bhutto Foundation, 
2008), accessed November 2, 2012, http://www.sbf.org.pk/pdf/FATA-data.pdf.  
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Naveed Ahmed, "The Laws and Justice System in FATA with Recommendations for Reformations" 
(master's thesis, University of South Asia, 2008), 2.  
63Arab Naz and Hafeez-ur-Rahamn Chaudhry, "Pakhtunwali versus Islam: A Comparative Analysis of 
Women’s Rights in Islam and Their Violation under Pakhtunwali (Pakhtun Code of Life) in Khyber 
Pakhtunkhawa Pakistan," International Journal of Humanity and Social Sciences 1, no. 2 (July 1, 2011), 
23.  
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as essential to Pashtun life. It is taken as a code of conduct and faith, standing outside the 
Pashtun code of conduct, and its sole role is to regulate inter- and intra-tribal issues. 
Among Pashtuns, tribal leaders are not subordinated to Islamic leadership, making it 
difficult for a central religious leader to impose himself. Religion becomes apparent only 
in a crisis, when collective interests of the Pashtuns are threatened. In such cases, 
leadership is voluntarily passed on to the religious leaders.64 
Finally, the FATA is characterized by a very strong tribal structure. There are 
eleven major tribes and many smaller tribes within the Pashtuns. The majority of the 
population is Muslim. The tribesmen are known for their courage, dignity, and proverbial 
hospitality. They have always guarded their independence. The famous tribesmen of the 
FATA are the Utman Khel and Tarkani in Bajaur Agency; Mohmands in Mohmand 
Agency; Afridis and Shinwaris in Khyber Agency, Peshawar and Kohat; Orakzais in 
Orakzai Agency; Turis and Bangash in Kurram Agency; Khattaks in east and southeast of 
Kohat; Wazirs in NWA; and the Mahsuds in SWA.65 
3. Governance 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while speaking to a grand tribal Jirga on April 17, 1948 in 
Peshawar said:  
I am fully aware of the part that you have already played in the 
establishment of Pakistan, and I am thankful to you for all the sympathy 
and support you gave me in my struggle and fight for the establishment of 
Pakistan. Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurances and declarations 
we ordered the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a concrete and 
definite gesture on our part that we treat you with absolute confidence and 
trust.66  
Mr. Jinnah also guaranteed the culture prevailing in the tribal area by announcing 
that Pakistan did not want to affect the internal freedom enjoyed by the tribal society.67  
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 "Tribal and Ethnic Diversity," Federally Administered Tribal Areas, accessed November 1, 2012, 
http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=87.  
66 Amir Usman, "Military Operation in Waziristan," Dawn, May 2, 2005, Internet edition, Opinion, 
accessed November 3, 2012, http://archives.dawn.com/2005/05/02/op.htm.  
67 Ibid. 
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At the time of independence, Pakistan faced a host of problems. The political 
leadership that succeeded Jinnah chose to continue the treaties, agreements, and 
allowances between the British and the border tribes, refraining from interference with 
their independence.68 The basic understanding was that, internally, the area would remain 
autonomous and the government of Pakistan would look after the area’s external security 
and development. The aim was to gradually improve the tribal areas economically so that 
over time they could play a bigger role with the rest of the country.  
To make tribal leaders more authoritative and thus better able to control the tribal 
areas, the government of Pakistan engaged in new agreements with the chiefs in 1951–
1952. A dramatic change in government policy occurred in 1955, when the one-unit plan 
for the former West Pakistan was introduced. According to this policy, the Punjab, 
former NWFP, Baluchistan, Sindh and the tribal areas were put together under the name 
of West Pakistan. The administration of the tribal areas was taken over by the ruler of 
West Pakistan, who acted as an intermediary to the president of Pakistan.69 
The first constitution of Pakistan went into effect on March 23, 1956. Although it 
created a parliamentary government, it did not change the political and administrative 
setup of the tribal areas.70 Under Article 247 of the 1973 constitution, central and 
provincial laws could not be applied, due to the unusual conditions and difficulties of the 
tribal areas. At the same time, these areas were excluded from the domains of 
fundamental human rights and equal protection under the law, which were guaranteed to 
every citizen in the constitution. Article 247 renders these protections null and void in the 
tribal areas and explains the working parameters of the tribal areas as a “separate 
administrative system.” Under this arrangement, the president of Pakistan is not only the 
constitutional figurehead, but also the chief executive of the tribal areas.  
                                                 
68 Rashid A. Khan. “Political Developments in FATA: A Critical Perspective,” in Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan: Challenges and Responses. Islamabad: IRPI (2005), 30.  
69 Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan, and Maqsudul Hasan Noori, Federally Administered Tribal 
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Under Article 247, the president has the exclusive authority to decide which laws 
will be applied in tribal areas. Article 51 (6) of the constitution empowers the president to 
extend the electoral system, based on adult franchise, to tribal areas. The article states, 
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this article, the President may, by order, make 
such provisions as to the manner of filling the seats in the National Assembly allocated to 
the FATA as he may think fit.”71  
Typically, twelve members of the National Assembly (MNA) from the FATA are 
elected on the basis of adult franchise. However, the tribal people of KP have no 
representation in the MNA. The eight FATA senators who represent the tribes in the 
senate are elected by the twelve MNAs of the FATA. These members of parliament 
participate in legislating for the entire country, but cannot make law for their own area. 
Furthermore, Article 247 (6) of the constitution grants presidential powers to 
abolish the tribal areas without any constitutional amendment:  
The President may, at any time, by order, direct that whole or any part of 
tribal area shall cease to be tribal area and such ordinance may contain 
such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to 
be necessary and proper. Provided that before making any order under this 
clause, the President shall ascertain in such manner as he considers 
appropriate, the views of the people of Tribal Areas concerned as 
represented in tribal Jirga.72 
According to the constitution, neither the supreme court nor the high court 
exercises any authority in the tribal areas, unless the parliament authorizes the laws. 
Although the administrative system inherited from the British was highly anomalous, 
Pakistan continued with that system and adopted all treaties made by the British with the 
tribal people. The institutions of PA and maliks continued. Under the British, a PA was 
appointed in each agency whose primary function was not to look after the welfare of the 
people, but to look after the interests of the British crown through domination and 
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persecution. Good governance meant administration through all means, fair or foul, 
including the harshest possible methods. The task of the PA was to collect intelligence, 
cultivate informers, create friction among the tribes, and keep the lines of communication 
open between the garrisons maintained in the tribal areas. Control was exercised through 
tribal levies, khasadars and militia.  
With the British gone, the PA is the executive, police, and judge, as well as 
dispenser of goods, permits, and development projects. The PA’s main duties are to keep 
general peace, maintain the roads, and protect government property. As an executive, the 
PA ensures law and order, collects revenues and taxes, approves rural development plans, 
and performs judicial duties under the FCR. He disburses, at his discretion, various 
allowances and funds to tribesman for political work. He also approves scholarships, 
rations, and domicile certificates. Under his signature, charcoal and timber permits are 
also issued.73 The character and wisdom of a PA are important in the political handling of 
the tribes. Generally, the PA has no role to play in the day-to-day life of tribal people; he 
acts only when an extraordinary situation develops, for example, when tribal hostilities 
break out. The power vested in the PA has often been misused, which restricts 
development and positive changes in the tribal areas.74 Dissatisfaction with the PA or his 
junior field officers is expressed by sniping, demolishing of government buildings, and 
even kidnapping.75 According to Mateen A. Mirza: 
Finally, there are three reasons why control over the FATA has been 
entrusted directly to the Federal Government. First, in view of the 
sensitive nature of the Durand Line as an international border between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, the federal government wanted to look after 
security issues in these areas. In addition, the government wanted to clamp 
down on the Pashtun issue, and ethnic-based nationalist politics in the 
NWFP. Second, the tribal areas are the poorest and most underdeveloped 
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region of Pakistan. To bring tribal areas on par with the settled areas of the 
NWFP required a massive effort to initiate development work which could 
only be undertaken by the federal government. Third, in the 1948 grand 
tribal Jirga previously mentioned, two hundred Maliks pledged their 
allegiance to Pakistan and unanimously requested to be placed under the 
direct administration of the central government.76 
4. Security, Law, and Order  
As previously mentioned, the tribal areas have been neglected by the central 
governments of Pakistan. Not only have the people been left on their own, but murderers 
and thieves have often sought refuge in the tribal areas. The Soviet–Afghan War 
exacerbated the problems of lawlessness and criminal refuge. Weapons began to flow to 
the area in abundance, and mujahedeen took refuge in the area. Pakistan used the 
ungoverned area to help supply the Afghan fighters with U.S.-backed supplies.77  
Intervention by Pakistan and United States during the war resulted in the creation 
of a puppet government in Afghanistan, led by Babrak Karmal. This Soviet-backed 
government was weak and unable to provide security. The harsh policies of the Karmal 
regime forced many Pashtuns to move across the border to Pakistan and take refuge in 
the FATA and KP, where a number of Afghan refugee camps were established. These 
camps later became recruiting and training centers for mujahedeen.78 After the Afghan 
war, these trained fighters were left on their own to continue jihad against states that they 
believed to be oppressing Muslims. Hence the FATA became the base for the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda.  
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country spiraled into civil 
war. Jalaluddin Haqqani, Hekmatyar, and others controlled a vast number of militants in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, who spread insecurity in the area. This new chaos led to the 
birth of the Taliban, composed of Afghan orphans. Numerous madrassas were built in the 
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Pakistan–Afghanistan region, with teachings strictly focused on fighting infidels.79 The 
madrassas used Islamic ideology as a way of creating an army of anti-communist guerilla 
fighters. The Taliban’s swift rise to power was the result of the disorder and civil war that 
ensued following the complete breakdown of law and order in Afghanistan after the 
Soviet retreat.80 
September 11th and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan also affected security in the 
FATA. In early 2002, the Pakistani military commenced operations in the FATA, with 
the aim of combatting militant groups in the area. The military authorities started dealing 
directly with the militants and their tribal intermediaries. The tribes and maliks could not 
stand up to the military and opted to make peace deals with the government of Pakistan.81 
Later events revealed that these peace deals provided time for the militants to organize 
themselves, and the peace deals failed.82 Militants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda beheaded 
almost 300 maliks in the FATA, accusing them of collaborating with the Pakistani army 
and intelligence services.83 Foreign fighters supported by local sympathizers launched an 
insurgency against the government of Pakistan, ranging from raids and ambushes to 
suicide missions.  
The overall security situation in the FATA has not changed. Despite a large 
number of troops present in the area and targeted military operations, the FATA has not 
evolved. The presence of foreign fighters could not be eliminated because of the freedom 
of movement across the Durand Line and local tribes’ support of foreign fighters. 
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5. Outside Influences 
Outside influences have greatly changed dynamics within the FATA. In 
particular, the Soviet–Afghan war and efforts to arm the Afghan mujahedeen against the 
Soviet army in the 1980s had a detrimental effect on the area. Initially U.S. funding to the 
mujahedeen began at $20 to $30 million in 1980 and increased to $630 million a year in 
1987.84 A good portion of this money went to fighters in the FATA, creating, in effect, a 
new form of economy for the area. 
Pakistani, U.S., and Saudi Arabian support for an anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan 
subsequently altered the structure of governance in the FATA. During this time, 
mujahedeen commanders and mullahs (Islamic clerics) emerged to weaken the traditional 
governance model in the tribal areas.85 The military commanders at the forefront of the 
jihad against the Soviets became increasingly powerful because of their leadership skills 
and capability as fighters. The mullahs, who were disregarded and mocked before the 
Soviet invasion, gained influence because of the religious motivation they provided for 
the war. The power of the commanders and mullahs grew even stronger with the large 
sums of money channeled in by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia through Pakistan. Therefore, 
political agents and maliks stopped enjoying the status of sole power brokers in the 
FATA. As the staging area for Operation Cyclone,86 the FATA was left with a destroyed 
system, the world’s largest refugee population, radical Islam, drugs, and weapons.87 The 
terrorist attacks of Al Qaeda, including 9/11, were deeply rooted in the Soviet–Afghan 
war.  
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The FATA is among those few troubled areas of the world that came into the 
limelight especially after 9/11, needing attention from the international community. 
Pakistan joined the war on terrorism and deployed 80,000 troops along the western 
border to capture or kill Taliban and Al Qaeda militants escaping from Afghanistan.88 
The situation in the FATA took a turn for the worse when U.S. and NATO forces invaded 
Afghanistan in October 2001. U.S. drone strikes and Pakistani military operations in the 
tribal area triggered 980,000 FATA residents to relocate to other parts of Pakistan.89 This 
led to a spillover of militancy from Afghanistan into the FATA, with thousands of 
militants belonging to the Afghan Taliban and the Arab Al Qaeda rushing in. Foreign 
affiliates of these groups—including Uzbeks, Chechens, and Tajiks—came to the tribal 
areas to establish bases to carry on their fight against the U.S. and allied forces in 
Afghanistan.90 The local tribes who believed in the cause provided support to the 
fighters, while local militants who were allied with the Afghan Taliban before 9/11 began 
to form local Taliban groups. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The area now known as the FATA has, throughout history, been semi-
autonomous. It held great strategic importance in the 19th century, serving as a buffer 
zone between the British colonial government of India and Russia. More than a century 
has passed, and the FATA is once again a cause of concern in the security of the 
international community. This area is becoming increasingly impoverished and 
marginalized due to different administrative systems and vulnerability to exploitation at 
the hands of criminal and extremist elements.  
This thesis’ five study variables—geography, society, governance, security, and 
international influences—reveal the following findings regarding the FATA’s persistence 
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as an area that supports domestic and international terrorism. Although tribal culture, 
political situations, and lack of governance in the FATA are critical factors, the 
geographical location of the FATA, instability in Afghanistan, and the interest of 
superpowers in Afghanistan and adjoining lands further complicated the situation in the 
FATA. Taken together, these factors have made the FATA an ideal location for terrorists 
to organize and train. 
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 ALGERIA’S KABYLIA REGION III.
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although much attention has been paid to the FATA region of Pakistan and the 
conditions that have led to its being a safe haven for terrorism, the FATA is not the only 
region that is harboring transnational terrorists. The Kabylia region in Algeria is currently 
one of the principle basing areas for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM), and the 
Algerian government and international powers face similar concerns with curbing 
terrorist activities in this region. This chapter, therefore, presents an overview of the 
Kabylia region in Algeria, with the goal of better understanding the conditions that have 
led to transnational terrorism’s basing in the area.  
This chapter begins by discussing the historical background of the Kabylia region, 
starting with the Ottoman occupation of the northern part of Africa and concluding with 
recent events in the area, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Second, it uses the five study 
variables to analyze the conditions that led to the security situation in the Kabylia region: 
the geography, society, governance, security, and the external influence connected to this 
area. The chapter concludes by summarizing the conditions that have led to Kabylia 
connection to criminal groups and AQIM. 
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
In 1504, the Ottoman brothers, Aruj and Khayr al-Din, liberated the city of 
Algiers from Spanish occupation.91 Following liberation, Algiers expanded its influence 
into the eastern and western regions of what is now known as Algeria. The Turkish 
janissary (odjak) remained in Algiers and created the dey (the regency), which became 
the supreme political authority within Algiers.92 Despite some opposition from the 
indigenous population, the new Turkish province was able to control the coastal part of 
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Tlemcen in the west and Constantine and its coastal regions in the east. Ottomans, 
therefore, gave geographical shape to contemporary Algeria. To manage the territory, 
they adopted four administrative divisions, known as beylics: Dar Al Sultan included 
mainly the regency of Algiers and the plains of Mettija; Beylic Titri included the central 
part of the country; Beylic Al Shark lay in the eastern part of Algeria, to the frontiers with 
Tunisia; and Beylic Al Gharb, with Mascara, then Oran, as its capital, included the 
western part of the country, to the frontiers of Morocco.93 The four beylics were partially 
autonomous, but still had to pay taxes to the regency of Algiers. 
Along with territorial subdivisions, the regency adopted a three-part tribal 
subdivision of the area. The first category was the urban tax-exempt area, which included 
janissary armies and the auxiliary Kouloughlis and Makhzan tribes who helped to protect 
the urban core. The second category, Ahl al Makhzan, was composed mainly of Rayat, 
taxpaying tribes and non-tribal sedentaries. This group of tribes exchanged services with 
the other groups. They also formed a protective buffer for the central government against 
the fourth category, which were the independent Kabylia tribes.94 
The majority of janissary troops were stationed in Algiers; nevertheless they 
maintained a number of garrisons at strategic points around the country.95 In addition to 
defending key points, their primary mission was collecting taxes, along with the Makhzen 
tribes. Except for the Kabyilia region, the regency of Algiers was able to control the north 
of what is now Algeria to the pre-Saharan region.96 The mountainous areas that were not 
directly controlled, specifically Kabylia and Dahra, had to pay higher taxes to the central 
government to get access to outside markets. Even though Ottoman hegemony was 
spread throughout the region, some of the local tribes did not recognize the beylic of 
Algiers’ domination. However, anti-Ottoman sentiment was not strong; most tribes did 
not reject the power of the regency and did not revolt against it. This compliance was due 






primarily to tribal consensus that the Turks were fellow Muslims and the real danger 
came from the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, which was Christian.97  
The French historian Devoulx dates the emergence of Algerian–French relations 
by noting: “Marseille, the southern French city, had trade relations with the coastal city of 
Bejaia since the thirteenth century, a treaty of commerce and fishing in the early 
fourteenth century.”98 Just as important, Algeria and France engaged in peace treaties 
over piracy, which became the main issue in bilateral relations. Trade and treaties were 
the main source of power and finance in Algiers, where agriculture and small industry 
were secondary resources. France and other European countries paid taxes to the regency 
to protect their commerce through the Mediterranean Sea. Despite the economic and 
diplomatic ties between Algerian and its European neighbors, Algiers faced European 
military campaigns in retaliation for high taxes, European slavery, and the capturing of 
merchant ships by Algerian naval forces.99  
The early relationship between Algiers and France was punctuated by 
misinterpretation, uncertainties, tensions, and occasional armed conflict. In general, peace 
treaties outlived diplomatic turbulence and wars; some treaties with France survived 
more than two hundred years.100 France and Algeria’s economic and diplomatic 
relationship also persisted. Algiers supplied the 1798 French campaign against Egypt, 
along with the Napoleonic wars. Two Jewish families in Algeria, Bakri and Bushnak, 
assured commercial relationships with Europe, including grain to European markets, 
which created large debts between the French government and Algiers. 101  
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The 1827 “Coup d’Eventaille” marked the beginning of the end of the Kingdom 
of Algiers after more than three centuries of dominating the Mediterranean.102 Dey 
Hocine of Algiers, in a dispute with Pierre Duval, the French consul, over French debt, 
quit the palace. France allegedly took the event as an excuse to invade the country and 
put out the upheavals against the kingdom.103 France defeated the regency and Dey 
Hocine gave up the city. Among other things, the invasion showed the fragility of the 
defense infrastructure of the regency. The conquest of Algiers ignited France’s imperial 
appetite.  
The 1830 Treaty of Algiers put only the city of Algiers (Dar Al Sultan) under 
French control; the other parts of the country were not included.104 In fact, the French 
expansion encountered a ferocious resistance from the autochthone population. Abd el-
Kader, the leader of the resistance, formed allegiances with previously divided tribal 
leaders to wage jihad against the French. These new alliances enabled him to defeat the 
French troops in many battles, eventually leading to the Desmichels treaty in February 
1844.105 Later, he consolidated his control over the areas allotted by the treaty, except for 
the Kabylia region, which showed steadfast opposition to his authority. However, in 
1847, Abd el-Kader surrendered to the French government after failing to attract 
Moroccan support and in the face of improved French military practices.106 
During Ottoman rule, the majority of the inhabitants of the plains and cities of 
present day Algeria were “arabicized,” meaning that they learned to speak Arabic and to 
identify with Arab culture. In the less accessible areas, including Kabylia, the people 
maintained their Berber identity. Lesser Kabylia (Bejaia), had the seaport of Bejaia, and 
was autonomous vis-a-vis the regency of Algiers. Greater Kabylia was ruled by the 
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kingdom of Kouko until 1857.107 The two parts of Kabylia, therefore, retained the use of 
their language and customs. Nineteenth-century French invaders were not surprised by 
the presence of the Berbers. They had conducted previous studies about the nature of 
Kabylia, including its geography and culture.108 However, the French did not turn their 
attention to Kabylia until the elimination of Emir Abd-el-Kader’s popular resistance in 
1847. Following his defeat, the French began to access Kabylia through military 
engagements. The French conquered the region in 1857, taking many prisoners and 
deporting resistance leaders to New Caledonia. During this time, large numbers of men 
left Kabylia109 to regions offering work, such as Tunisia, Morocco, and metropolitan 
France.110 The French remained in Kabylia until the independence of Algeria in 1962.  
 
Figure 3.  Algeria: unrest and impasse in Kabylia 
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The first significant political movement, called the “Young Algerians,” was led 
by Khaled, the grandson of Abd el-Kader. The movement started when the French 
government introduced conscription for young Algerians in 1911. Inspired by French 
political grievances, the Young Algerians demanded the right to vote, representation in 
the national assembly, and equality in paying taxes.111 In 1912, Khaled sent a delegation 
to the French parliament demanding clear assimilation in rights between the Muslim 
population and French colonials in Algeria. The demands of the delegation met with 
complete denial by the French government and they were accused of menacing the 
prosperity of the colony. 112  
World War I was another factor that contributed to the Algerian national 
awakening. French colonials in Algeria were exempt from conscription; however the 
French government forced 173,000 Algerians to fight against Germany. Most of them 
perished in combat.113 This embittered the Algerians toward French colonization. In 
addition, more than 120,000 Algerian workers contributed to the war effort in factories 
and on farms. The war was an opportunity for Algerians to encounter and learn from the 
French of the metropolis and other vulnerable people of the French empire. Moreover, 
the Algerians were also exposed to anti-French propaganda and the concept of Wilson’s 
principle of self-determination.114 All of these factors contributed to Khaled’s Young 
Algerians’ demands for equality. In 1919, the French government issued new laws 
concerning certain categories of Algerians, such as veterans and educated people. These 
groups benefitted from the right to citizenship and access to government jobs.115And in 
1926, the Young Algerian movement extended its demands from assimilation to full 
equality with French citizens in rights and duties, which were rejected once again by the 
settlers. 
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The 1920s witnessed the rise of a new Islamic revival throughout most of the 
Muslim world. Eminent Muslim scholars Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis, Bashir Ibrahimi, and 
Shaykh Tayyib Uqbi formed “the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama [religious 
scholars]” under the leadership of Ben Badis.116 It devoted its struggle to combat the 
extraneous ways that colonialism affected the Algerian society, such as Western 
education. The Ulama established a reliable educational network based on Islamic 
sciences and the Arabic language. They extended their reformist activities through media 
and recruiting. In general, the demands of the Ulama were more about improving 
Muslims’ economic and social life than evoking a religious revival. The movement, 
however, did not go beyond rhetoric.117  
Another key movement for national independence was the Etoile Nord Africaine 
(ENA), headed by Messali Hajj. The political agenda of the party was to create a real 
alternative to colonial rule. Specifically, the ENA called for the independence of Algeria 
from France and withdrawal of French troops.118 The French administration took action 
at once and dissolved the ENA.119 However, Algerians’ bid for national independence 
continued, and other political parties emerged such as the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA) 
and the Parti Communiste Algerien (PCA).  
At the end of World War II, Algerians took to the streets hoping for 
independence. These celebrations turned bloody in the eastern provinces (Setif and 
Constantine), where masses demanded independence and were met with force. In Setif, 
clashes between police and nationalists morphed into a riot, and angry demonstrators 
turned against the French colonials. The French army responded with brutal force; 
thousands of people were killed or arrested.120 These events compelled the nationalist 
movement to turn to violence to liberate the country. The Special Organization (SO) 
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appeared, with the aim of collecting weapons for combat.121 In 1950, conflicts between 
the SO and political nationalists eventually ended the mission of the OS.122  
In 1954, following this initial dispute, most members of the OS were organized 
into the Committee Revolutionnaire d’Unite et d’Action (CRUA). This twenty-two 
member committee continued the mission of the OS and announced the birth of the Front 
de Liberation National (FLN), a new revolutionary movement, whose mission was to 
carry out armed struggle to gain independence. On November, 1, 1954, the FLN issued its 
first declaration to the Algerian people, which was also a declaration of war on France. 
The FLN, with its armed branch, l’Armee de Liberation National (ALN), conducted a 
war of attrition against the colonizing forces. After seven years, this struggle ended with a 
self-determination referendum and independence on July 5, 1962. 123  
In 1963, post-independence trauma was heightened when the Popular National 
Army (ANP), the new Algerian forces, intervened in Kabylia during an armed revolt. The 
uprising was led by Ait Ahmed Hocine, one of the engineers of the Algerian national 
revolution against the French. The aftermath of these events is very significant in the 
Berber’s social memory, which saw the ANP as a new army of occupation.124 The 
population believed that the central government was using security to justify the 
oppression of the Kabylia population and separatist movements. 125  
The “Berber Spring” of 1980 brought into the public arena the cultural and 
political demands of Kabylia, which were previously largely ignored or obscured.126 
Before the 1980s, Berber demands did not play a specific role in the evolution of politics 
and culture in Algeria. During the “Black Spring” of 2001, the region witnessed violent 
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riots where hundreds of people lost their lives. 127 Young people, overwhelmed by social 
problems and motivated by movements demanding autonomy, protested against the 
central government. The excessive use of government force led the Kabylia Autonomy 
Movement (MAK) to declare independence and form an exile Kabylia government.128 
Even though not recognized in the Kabylia region itself, this movement carries the 
grievances of a large portion of the population. 
The 9/11 attacks returned the Kabylia struggle to national and international 
attention. Addressing grievances in Kabylia became an important strategy for fighting 
Islamic terrorism, because several groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda had found refuge in 
the mountains of Kabylia. Since the 2007 announcement of the birth of AQIM by its 
leader Abdelmalek Droukdal (originally from the Kabylia region), this terrorist 
organization has been able to conduct major attacks against the state and foreign 
nationals from its safe haven in Kabylia. Perhaps the most brutal of these attacks, for 
which AQIM claimed responsibility, was in December 2007, when two cars exploded in 
front of a government building. Seventeen people died and several dozen were injured.129 
Furthermore, affiliated groups of AQIM have been the main perpetrator of tourist 
kidnappings in the Sahel region and the Sahara, also causing instability in Algeria and 
beyond.130  
C. ANALYSIS OF KABYLIA  
 This section uses the five study variables of the thesis—geography, 
society, governance, security, and international actors—to analyze the conditions under 
which Kabylia became a region of criminal activity and a safe haven for AQIM.  
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1. Geography  
The Kabylia region sits between the provinces of Jijel in the east and Bouira in 
the south. The region includes seven administrative provinces: Boumerdess, Tiziouzou, 
Bejaia, Setif, Jijel, Bouira and Bordj Bouariridj (see Figure 4–5) with almost 22,300 
square kilmeters in total.131 Geographically, Kabylia is divided into two major parts, 
separated by mountain ranges: Greater Kabylia and Lesser Kabylia. The two regions are 
separated in the east by the Soummam and Seybouse rivers. The coastal areas are largely 
mountainous in the eastern part of the region, except for the coastal cities of Bejaia and 
Jijel. The mountainous region of Kabylia varies from 1,300 to 4,300 feet in elevation, 
with the highest peaks being Lala Khadidja, Haizer, and Timedjoune.132 In the interior, 
the southern provinces of Setif and Bouira are marked by wide, high plains.  
 
Figure 4.  Kabylian main cities  
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Figure 5.  Kabylian administrative divisions 
2. Society 
Berbers or “Imazighen” are the ancient inhabitants of North Africa, especially the 
region of Kabylia; they differ from Arabs in language, history and heritage. The 
estimated population of Berbers in Algerian is approximately 9–10 million, which is 20 
to 25 percent of the country’s population. In fact Kabylia is the most densely populated 
mountainous area in the world, at more than 510 inhabitants per square km.133 Berbers 
are characterized by a distinctive physical appearance as to light skin, facial shape, and 
light hair. They are known to value private property and have a natural aptitude for 
commerce.134  
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Berbers believe in their superiority and ethnic linkage to Europeans, a myth that 
France has supported since 1857.135 The main language spoken is the Berber language, 
Tamazight, used in a dozen countries across the Maghreb–Sahel–Saharan region, 
including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Mauritania. But Algeria and Morocco have by far the largest Berber populations. The 
Berbers have a consonantal alphabet that has existed since antiquity. The most ancient 
inscriptions date back to the sixth century B.C., and the language was found throughout 
the ancient world, including in the Punic and Roman eras. Although never mentioned by 
medieval Arab authors, it is specifically mentioned by Latin authors of the late fifth and 
sixth centuries.136 The Berber language, therefore, and the culture it supports, are ancient 
and a source of pride for the people of Kabylia. 
Berber society is thought to be the most democratic within the region. All 
members of the village take part in electing their representatives to the local committee, 
and opportunities are equal regardless of other considerations. Furthermore, Berber 
society has greater tendencies toward secular values than religious.137 Education in 
Kabylia is excellent and excels beyond its neighbors. Berbers encourage education for 
both genders and are known to be the toughest intellectuals in Algeria.138  
Kabyle women occupy a cardinal place in the preservation and reproduction of 
Berber culture and have perpetuated the culture despite the difficult situations they 
historically faced. Before the Arab conquest, Kabylia women played an important role 
and were sometimes the head of kingdoms; Fatma N’soummar, for example, was the 
head of an army that confronted the French in 1857.139  
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However, the condition of the Kabyle women has deteriorated over the years. 
They have been victims of injustice and violence from a society that has become acuttely 
sexist, based in large part by the adoption of practices from Islamic (shariah) law. Under 
shariah, men are considered superior to women in the family code, which contradicts the 
Berber culture, in which women are respected as individuals and spouses.  
Furthermore, state interventions aimed at changing the tribal structure of the 
Kabylia and introducing new administrative divisions may jeopardize national security 
and promote instability. Similarly, the Algerian constitution, which states in its second 
and third article that Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic the national and official 
language, tends to purposely omit Berber traditional values.140 These policies have 
provoked several civic revolts to recognize Berber as a national language. The 
government’s reluctance to take action is creating space for more extremist revolts and 
movements to take root, such as the MAK, which proclaims the autonomy of the Kabylia 
region and threatens national unity. 
Finally, though the Kabylia population is assumed to be a completely Muslim 
community, a large number of Christians and atheists are recorded in Kabylia, more than 
any other region in Algeria. Many Berbers renounced their Islamic faith and converted to 
Christianity with the efforts of missionaries in the aftermath of the Algerian national 
tragedy during the nineties.141  
Despite political and social tensions in the region, Kabylia has attracted the 
greatest national and international investments in Algeria. In 2011, Tizi Ouzou, the 
capital of Kabylia benefited from 928 new developmental projects.142 The province of 
Tizi Ouzou ranks first nationally for projects registered in 2011 at the National Agency 
for Investment and Development (ANDI).143 According to a ranking compiled by the 
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Directorate-General of ANDI for 2012, more than $2 billion in projects will create 
around 4,783 jobs.144 This investment and development is in spite of the isolation of 
Kabylia, which is not accessed by any highways, railways or ports. Investments and 
development in the Kabylia region encounter several challenges. The tribal mentality is 
one of the most important. Berbers, who value their private property, do not give up their 
land for public benefits. Indicators show that despite the economic reforms conducted by 
the Algerian government, intended to improve the living situation and prosperity in 
Kabylia and cut support for the separatists, Berber society is not satisfied, and the 
economy depends on remittances from the large number of immigrants in Europe.  
3. Governance 
The core element of Kabylia society is the village (taddart). Each village has 
legislative and executive powers and calls the village assembly, which includes all 
citizens of the village. The village leader, or amghar (elder), is elected by the members of 
a committee (the thadjmaat). These committees make sovereign decisions through 
democratic decision-making processes. Unity among several villages makes an aarch. 
The union of several aarchs makes a coordination of aarchs, which outlines rules of 
exchange, solidarity and, in particular, mutual defense in the event of outside aggression. 
Several aarchs, when united, can resolve short- and long-term issues.145  
The Kabyle reliance on ancestral institutions has lasted for centuries and been a 
major contributor to the people’s sense of protectiveness over their independence and 
cultural values, which are built on the rights of the community. Democratic discussions in 
the village meetings teach and support this awareness.  
Berber society is unique in its functional structure. The traditional institutions 
show effectiveness in managing daily business. Berber society, represented by village 
committees, takes advantage of the Kabylia regional characteristics and availability of 
financial and human resources to further entrench an isolated and independent society 
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that does not recognize the state, constitutional divisions, and laws. The inner 
organization of the Berber society competes with and contradicts the state and its 
institutions. This is particularly true when it comes to security in the region.  
4. Security  
Historically, Berber identity has been the core grievance and cause of insecurity 
in the Kabylia region. In September 1963, a year after Algerian independence, Berber 
groups led by Ait Ahmed Hocine, one of the engineers of the revolution against France, 
refused to give up arms and reintegrate into Arab society. The Popular National Army 
(ANP) intervened in Kabylia during the armed revolt of Ait Ahmed Hocine; the 
consequences of these events are very significant in the Berber’s social memory, which 
see the ANP as a new army of occupation.146 The population believes that the Algerian 
government is using security to justify the oppression of the Kabylia population and 
separatist movements.  
Many movements appeared in the post-independence era that recognize Berber as 
a national identity, call for autonomy to Kabylia, and demand that the presence of 
security forces in the region be reduced.147 The “Berber Spring” of 1980 suddenly 
brought into the public arena the cultural and political demands of Kabylia, which were 
previously largely ignored or obscured.148 During the “Black Spring” of 2001, the region 
witnessed violent riots where hundreds of people lost their lives.149 Young people, 
overwhelmed by social problems and motivated by movements demanding autonomy, 
protested against the central government. The excessive use of government force led the 
Kabylia Autonomy Movement (MAK) to declare independence and form an exile 
                                                 
146 Chaker Salem. "La question berbère dans l'Algérie indépendante : la fracture inévitable ?." Revue 
du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, accessed May 12,2012 . 
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/remmm_0997-1327_1992_num_65_1_1557. 
 147 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Gilles Manceron, Algerie: Comprendre la Crise,( Belgium: Impremerie Complexe, 1996),164.  
149 Maddy Weizman, Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African 
States,( University of Texas Press, 2011), 185.  
 50
Kabylia government.150 Even though not recognized in the Kabylia region itself, this 
movement continues to carry the grievances of a large portion of the population and will 
most likely persist into the future.  
According to the Algerian constitution, the state is responsible for the security of 
its citizens and their property. However, until the beginning of the 1990s, security in 
Kabylia was guaranteed by the local committees. The beginning of the nineties was 
marked by a sharp deterioration in the security situation, especially after the coup d’état 
of 1992.151 With the emergence of terrorist organizations in the Kabylia region (whose 
members are mainly Kabyles), traditional village committees could not face organized 
crime and Al Qaeda-affiliated groups all alone.152  
AQIM, through a complex network of recruitment and weapons smuggling, fhas 
ound a perfect haven in Kabylia. The mountainous region, naturally fortified, provides a 
defense for terrorist groups in the area. The neutrality of the Berber society toward the 
fight against terrorism is another vital element that extends the AQIM presence. AQIM 
has recruited the local population by force as well as through blood ties.  
At first, the villages of Kabylia suffered terrorist attacks regularly. Several 
localities broke their silence with the creation of the first self-defense groups in Kabylia. 
Berbers made headlines by deciding to arm themselves to protect their lives and property. 
This initiative spread quickly, and virtually all the provinces were mobilized as Groupe 
de Ligitime Defense (GLD) to deal with the attacks of jihadi groups.153 With the help of 
the Algerian central government, weapons were distributed to civilians throughout 
Algeria, including the Kabylia region. The authorities, who tended at first to deny the 
existence of militias or minimize their role, have openly encouraged civilians to take up 
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arms and organize into militias. National television has reported militia activities, 
praising their role in the “fight for the elimination of terrorism” and allocated 
advertisement space encouraging men to create militias, under the motto “rijal khuliqu lil 
Watan” (men born for the country). The newspapers have also begun to give more 
prominence to the activities of militias.154  
Following this mobilization, the militias, along with the other branches of the 
security forces, were accused of human-rights violations against the local population, 
including those in Kabylia. According the to a 1997 UNHCR report, there were large-
scale violations of human rights all over the country by the security forces and terrorist 
groups.155  
5. Outside Influence  
The struggle between the Kabylia region and the Algerian government has been 
fed, in part, by the Berber myth. Berbers believe in their superiority and shared common 
origin with Europeans. This myth was encouraged by strenuous efforts to rediscover their 
Latin-Christian origins. In 1962, the hostility of the post-independence Algerian 
government toward the social, political, and administrative structure of Kabylia pushed 
Berbers further away from joining Algerian society. Faced with this long-standing 
hostility, the population of Kabylia constantly retrieved the traditional way of governance 
to meet their social, cultural, political, economic, and administrative aspirations.  
Currently, Kabylia represents a real challenge for Algerian national security. The 
emergence of the MAK in the 1960s began this challenge. Mainly supported by Morocco, 
France, and other western countries, the MAK tried to internationalize the Berber 
question.156 Several actions were taken by this movement, such as creating a provisional 
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government in exile and endeavoring to get international recognition and support for the 
independence of the Kabylia region. Algeria’s western neighbor, Morocco, is heavily 
involved in this turmoil. The relationship between Algeria and Morocco is historically 
characterized by tension over the Occidental Sahara conflict. The Algerian stance, which 
supports the right of self-determination, is faced with undercover support for the MAK by 
Morocco. Algeria allegedly supported the independence movement in the Occidental 
Sahara since 1975, by providing refuge, finance, and armament. In return, Morocco has 
taken advantage of the MAK’s declaration of autonomy and harnessed its potential to 
back the MAK up.  
The Algerian newspaper Ennahar claims that Morocco and Israel are the main 
suppliers of the Kabyle separatists.157 Ennahar further claims that one million Euros was 
given to the MAK from an American Jewish group.158 The MAK leader Ferhat Mhenni 
expressed his solidarity with Moroccan officials on the Occidental Sahara issue.159 In its 
endeavors to involve Israel in the conflict and get more financial support for the Berber 
cause, the MAK leader traveled to Tel Aviv in 2012 and gave a speech to the Israeli 
parliament (the Knesset).160 This visit complicated the political situation in Kabylia and 
widened the rift between the population and Berber elites.161  
The Kabylia struggle to impose its identity and the use of its language, along with 
the neutrality of the population in the war against terrorism, has provided many 
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opportunities for external actors to be involved. Many countries support the autonomy of 
Kabylia. The Algerian–Moroccan conflict over the Occidental Sahara is casting a shadow 
over the Kabylia region. Morocco supports the MAK in response to the Algerian support 
of the rebellion movement in the Sahara. Transnational terrorism, represented by AQIM, 
is another factor in the equation. Despite the pressure of the Algerian security forces, the 
AQIM, which controls the mountains of Kabylia, has found in these instable 
circumstances a perfect motivation to enlarge its activities into the Sahel region.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed the five variables that have contributed to the current 
situation in the region: the geography of the area and how it aggravated tribal trends 
toward autonomy, tribal society and mentality, the local governance structure and its 
relation to the state, chronic insecurity particularly following the emergence of AQIM, 
and finally the influence of the foreign hands in the conflict.  
Throughout 132 years of French presence in Algeria, Kabylia was considered a 
strategic area and an unstable zone at the same time. Fifty years after the independence of 
Algeria, the Kabylia region is still the center of turbulence, despite the efforts of the 
Algerian central government to improve the area economically. With the rise of extremist 
Islamic trends, Kabylia has become a base for terrorist activities and the stronghold of 
AQIM. This gives the area an international dimension, especially with the parallel rise of 
movements advocating the autonomy of Kabylia. 
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 COMPARING KABYLIA AND THE FATA IV.
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter builds on the above case studies of Kabylia and the FATA to analyze 
the similar and unique conditions that have led to these regions’ becoming fertile lands 
for extremism and transnational terrorism. Specifically, the chapter analyzes the five 
study variables—terrain, society, governance, security, and external influences—to 
discuss similarities and differences between Kabylia and the FATA and draw conclusions 
as to which variables may be most significant in their use as safe havens. 
B. GEOGRAPHY  
1. Similarities 
The geography of Kabylia plays a critical role for transnational terrorist groups in 
the region. The rough terrain, which kept Kabylia independent until French colonization, 
provides a suitable defensive position against invaders. The Kabylia region is divided 
into two major parts—Greater and Lesser Kabylia—separated by mountains and rivers. 
The coastal areas are largely mountainous in the east and there are wide, high plains in 
the south.  
These natural defenses have not only prevented invaders from occupying the area, 
but have also allowed illicit groups to establish themselves and flourish. Following 9/11, 
Kabylia became the stronghold for AQIM due to its rough terrain, which enables it to 
conduct terrorist attacks against Algerian and Western interests.  
The FATA’s terrain is similar to Kabylia; it is mountainous, rugged, rural, and 
difficult to invade and occupy. The FATA has a long history of hosting illegal groups. In 
particular, it became a key staging area for the mujahidin during the Soviet–Afghan War. 
Following 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the FATA became a critical 
safehaven for Al Qeada after it was forced to flee its sanctuary in Afghanistan. The 
FATA’s difficult terrain has made it difficult for Pakistan security forces to rout Al 
Qaeda and Taliban from the area.  
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2. Differences 
Despite their similar terrains, Kabylia and the FATA have one critical difference. 
Kabylia is surrounded by mainland Algeria and the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the 
FATA has a long, porous border with neighboring Afghanistan. This porous border has 
allowed illegal groups, including terrorists, to move between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
unobstructed. Efforts by Pakistan, Afghan Security Forces, and NATO to secure the 
border have proven unsuccessful.  
Although Kabylia does not share a border with a foreign neighbor, it still harbors 
foreign fighters, particularly after 9/11. The fact that Kabylia sits in the middle of 
Algeria, however, suggests that Algerian forces could potentially cordon off Kabylia 
more easily than Pakistan forces could secure the FATA’s border with Afghanistan. 
However, Algerian forces have not successfully contained Kabylia to date.  
C. SOCIETY 
1. Similarities 
The peoples of Kabylia and the FATA are distinct from the societies in their 
countries. Both speak a different language—Berber and Pashtun, respectively. 
Furthermore, both areas have peculiar tribal codes and cultural traditions that distinguish 
them in the countries in which they reside. Perhaps most significantly, both Kabylia and 
the FATA have strong tribal structures that dictate social and political relations. These 
strong tribal ties have made these areas impervious to the laws and customs of others in 
their countries. They also have provided opportunities for illicit groups to establish 
themselves. 
2. Differences 
Perhaps one of the most interesting differences between Kabylia and the FATA is 
the level of literacy and education in each region. Kabylians have a long history of 
education, stretching back to the presence of the French in the 1800s; they have high 
literacy rates and are generally well educated. The FATA, by contrast, has the lowest 
literacy rate in Pakistan and equally low educational possibilities.  
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The regions have differing economic possibilities as well. Kabylia has seen 
growth in industry and investment in the last few decades. With higher literacy and 
education, jobs and economic prosperity are possible in this region. The FATA, however, 
is punctuated by few economic opportunities. The major portion of income stems from 
the local arms industry, agriculture, and smuggling, professions that tend to prosper in the 
presences of illegal groups, including transnational terrorists.  
D. GOVERNANCE 
1. Similarities 
The terrain and strong tribal identities of Kabylians and the people of the FATA 
have also produced forms of governance that may affect the presence of transnational 
terrorist groups in these areas. Both regions have semi-autonomous forms of governance. 
In Kabylia, each area is governed by a village assembly elected by the people and a 
village leader elected by members of a committee. The people of Kabylia see this as their 
legitimate governance and the wider Algerian government as less valid, despite the fact 
that the Algerian government claims primary authority over the region.  
Somewhat similarly, the FATA is governed by PAs and maliks, who were 
historically empowered under the British. In addition, tribal elders play an important role 
in governance by mutual consultation of the population through tribal meetings. Finally, 
mullahs have had an increasingly important role in governing the region, particularly 
after their influence increased under the Soviet–Afghan war. These forms of leadership 
are distinct from the central government of Pakistan.  
2. Differences 
The only major distinction between Kabylia and the FATA region regarding 
governance is that the FATA enjoys a special status politically and legally within 
Pakistan. The region is not under direct control of the government. A special provision 
allows the president of Pakistan to directly intervene in the FATA but, otherwise, the 
federal government has limited jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction has prevented the 
government from having a strong presence in the region, including the absence of 
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development and federal security forces. There is a small representation of the FATA in 
the national assembly and the senate, but they are not empowered to bring change to the 
status of the area. Only the president of Pakistan can change the constitutional status of 
the FATA and bring reform.  
E. SECURITY 
1. Similarities 
As previously suggested, security in Kabylia and the FATA is precarious. Both 
regions have had minimal national-security protection. Both are difficult to access 
physically, which has prevented national-security forces from adequately controlling the 
regions.  
Furthermore, both regions have experienced chronic instability, albeit for 
different reasons. Kabylia has gone through episodes of unrest as part of their ongoing 
struggle to attain greater social, political, and cultural rights in Algeria. Recently, the 
region has experienced violence through the presence of AQIM, which will be described 
further below. The FATA has been plagued by unrest that derives largely from the 
presence of foreign influences, which will also be described below, and by becoming a 
buffer zone and staging area for great power politics. The FATA has also suffered from 
high rates of crime and illicit activities, which have further reduced its security. 
2. Differences 
Perhaps the greatest difference between Kabylia’s security concerns and that of 
the FATA is that the people of Kabylia do not want the presence of foreign fighters and 
AQIM in their area, but they are unable to push them out on their own. As described in 
Chapter III, the Kabylians have attempted to create local security forces to address the 
security concern posed by AQIM, but have been unable to thwart them to date.  
By contrast, the FATA’s security concerns come from a mix of local and foreign 
fighters, and it appears that the tribes in the FATA have developed a somewhat mutually 
beneficial relationship with these fighters. In other words, it is not clear that the 
population wants the Taliban and Al Qaeda gone from their region. As described in 
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Chapter II, Pakistan deployed its military to the FATA for the first time following 9/11, 
with the hopes of tamping down terrorism in the area. However, the operations were 
largely unsuccessful. The increase of U.S. drone strikes in the region may change this 
dynamic.  
Another unique facet of the FATA’s lack of security comes from the presence of 
Pashtun refugees from the Soviet–Afghan war. These refugees have settled in the FATA 
and KP, bringing increased pressure on limited resources in the area. Refugees have also 
become a hotbed of recruitment for the Taliban and possibly other terrorist groups, 
further decreasing security in the area.  
F. OUTSIDE INFLUENCES  
1. Similarities 
Although the Kabylia is an internal region within Algeria and the FATA has a 
long porous border, both regions are shaped by direct and indirect external influences. 
First, both are under international pressure to remove international terrorist organizations 
in their area, particularly Al Qaeda. The United States has named the FATA as one of the 
major areas of importance in fighting Al Qaeda and denying it sanctuary. The United 
States has used a number of means to achieve these ends. First, it has given Pakistan 
significant foreign aid with the hope that this will allow greater development and security 
in the FATA. Second, the United States has used direct military intervention in the form 
of drone attacks and placed diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to encourage it to contain 
transnational terrorism in the FATA. 
Similarly, international attention has focused on fighting AQIM in Kabylia. As 
described in Chapter III, the United States has given funding and military assistance to 
Algeria—although in significantly smaller sums than to Pakistan—in an effort to boost 
domestic security and help rout AQIM from the region. Kabylia may have the added 
bonus of leveraging the local population against AQIM, which does not want it in the 
region, but efforts to destroy the transnational terrorist group have yet to succeed.   
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2. Differences 
Despite the similar international attention given to fighting Al Qaeda in these 
regions, each also has unique external sources of influence. In Kabylia, the Berbers’ 
desire to maintain their social, cultural, and political autonomy has been shaped by 
external actors. Colonial France supported the Berber myth and fed it by claiming that 
Berbers had European ties and were superior to Arabs. Berber nationalism has further 
been supported by Morocco, which has recognized the MAK as a legitimate, independent 
Berber polity.  
The FATA also has external actors that continue to shape developments in the 
area. Following the end of the Soviet–Afghan war and the influx of Pashtun refugees to 
the FATA, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established charities and madrassas that targeted 
these vulnerable groups. Along with this aid came a militant ideology that helped shape 
the Taliban. During the ongoing NATO war in Afghanistan, the Taliban have become 
another external influence, taking advantage of FATA’s porous border to establish a safe 
haven in Pakistan, away from NATO’s reach and well hidden among fellow Pashtuns. 
These unique sources of instability show no signs of abating.  
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has built on case studies on the FATA and Kabylia to compare the 
distinctive and common attributes of each region as a sanctuary for transnational 
terrorism. Examining terrain, society, governance, security and external influences, this 
comparison reveals the following results. First, terrain is a common factor in sanctuary 
for transnational terrorists; both regions are mountainous and difficult to secure. Second, 
both societies are tribal and have separate cultures and languages from their countrymen. 
Third, both have a strong desire for self-rule. Fourth, both have experienced chronic 
insecurity. And finally, external actors have contributed to both regions’ insecurity and 
sanctuary status. 
Also important in this study are these regions’ differences. The FATA has a 
porous border, whereas Kabylia is an interior region of Algeria. Kabylians are largely 
educated and literate, while Pashtuns in the FATA are not. Both regions are 
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administrative exceptions in their countries. Although both areas are insecure, they have 
different causes for this insecurity. And the regional actors that influence the dynamics in 
these areas are different.  
The concluding chapter offers policy recommendations based on these findings. 
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 POLICY IMPLICATIONS V.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Having analyzed key variables in the FATA and Kabylia, this thesis has found 
that the following conditions have contributed to the establishment of havens for 
transnational terrorism. 
1. Geography 
Geography has a strong influence on the creation of safe havens. Mountainous 
regions that are difficult to traverse and have few roads make ideal conditions for terrorist 
groups to train, organize, and hide. These conditions also make it difficult for police and 
military to monitor and secure the area, adding to its appeal to terrorists. Second, for the 
FATA specifically, the presence of a porous, international border is a key contributor to 
its appeal as a terrorist safe haven, especially for transnational terrorists.  
The location of an area is unchangeable. However, there are options for mitigating 
geography’s effects. In the FATA as well as Kabylia, the road infrastructure is very 
weak, which makes these areas difficult to access by law-enforcement agencies. 
Improving infrastructure is therefore an important first step in making areas less 
hospitable to terrorist organizations. Improving the roads in the FATA and Kabylia is a 
feasible project for Pakistan and Algeria, respectively. Moreover, this should be a goal 
for areas with rugged terrain that show symptoms of becoming a haven. Securing the 
border in the FATA is a much more difficult undertaking than road construction, but 
nevertheless, the Pakistani government should work with Afghanistan to make the border 
less porous. 
2. Governance 
Since before the creation of Pakistan, the tribal people of the FATA have 
continued to live in their own traditional way. The FATA region enjoys semi-
autonomous status that is permitted by the constitution of Pakistan. Since the federal law 
and the judicial system of Pakistan are not applicable to the FATA, governance remains a 
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problem. The lack of political will by the government to bring the FATA on the same 
legal and political level with other areas of Pakistan is also a major contributing factor in 
the existence of safe havens in the area.  
In Kabylia, although there is strong federal and local government in place, the 
village system still predominates. Furthermore the reluctance of the central government 
to deal with the grievances of the Berber population is widening the gap between the 
people of Kabylia and the government. This gap between local and federal has been a 
problem because village government is too weak to oust terrorist groups, especially 
AQIM, and the federal government does not have the necessary presence to do so.  
Therefore, despite the contrasting reasons behind the lack of federal governance 
in the FATA and Kabylia, weak federal governance and control over these areas is 
contributing to the presence of terrorist sanctuaries. Thus, a low presence of government 
law and enforcement—particularly because the people reject the presence of the 
government in the area—is another important factor in the creation of sanctuaries. While 
geography contributes to minimal governance in both regions, cultural factors also play a 
role. Strong tribal structures and historic grievances against the federal government are 
also important to understanding this lack of federal control.  
3. Society 
The FATA and Kabylia have similar social structures, but different 
socioeconomic situations. Both Kabylia and the FATA have inherited a strong tribal 
culture with specific traditions. These traditions have created loyalty to the tribe or the 
village over the larger country. The tribal codes of conduct and traditions have some 
negative aspects that help promote terrorism, specifically codes of honor and hospitality 
that have embedded terrorist groups into the tribal culture. Both the FATA and Kabylia 
have allowed terrorist groups to create strongholds based on these tribal codes.  
Socioeconomically, the two regions are quite different. The FATA’s tribal society 
is very poor, the population illiterate and uneducated, and people rely on unlawful 
activities to earn a livelihood. The situation in Kabylia is different; people have economic 
opportunities and a strong work ethic and are well educated.  
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Therefore, tribal society has emerged as a contributing factor that promotes 
terrorism both in FATA and Kabylia—that is, places with strong tribal traditions appear 
to promote terrorist safe havens. By contrast, weak socioeconomic conditions have not 
proven to be a cause in either case. The FATA is extremely poor and uneducated; 
Kabylia is not. Tribalism, therefore, appears to be a more important contributor to the 
emergence of safe havens than socioeconomic conditions. 
4. Security 
This study has revealed that both Kabylia and the FATA have suffered chronic 
instability, which has provided good opportunities to terrorists. In the case of the FATA, 
the area was used to stage operations in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and the 
post-9/11 global war on terrorism (GWOT). The use of the FATA as staging area has led 
to an accumulation of arms, illegal activities, and refugees willing to support insurgencies 
and terrorism.  
In Kabylia, security has been an issue from the time of Algerian independence, 
and continues to the present. Despite efforts by the federal government to establish 
security in the region, the Berber’s perception of the government’s intentions as hostile to 
their culture and language has prevented the security services from being effective on the 
ground. The Algerian government’s war against AQIM has militarized the Kabylia region 
by pouring more forces into the area and creating self-defense groups and militias aimed 
at preventing the advance of terrorist attacks into the surrounding areas. These efforts 
have thus far proven ineffective in denying AQIM safe haven in the area. 
Despite the different reasons for instability in the FATA and Kabylia, its chronic 
presence provides an opportunity for terrorists to seize on this insecurity and establish 
bases. Chronic insecurity, in other words, creates the lawless and warlike conditions that 
are ideal to terrorists in their training, planning, and operations.  
5. Outside Influences 
External influences have played an important role in both areas. As mentioned, 
the FATA has a long history of interference from outsiders. It was a buffer between the 
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British and Russian Empires in the late 1800s, into the 1900s. It was chosen as a staging 
area by the United States at the time of Soviet–Afghan war. During this war, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE supported the people of the FATA by providing personnel, money, 
and arms to keep the spirit of jihad alive. The loyalties established during that time still 
appear to be present in the people of the FATA.  
Following 9/11, international interest in the FATA resumed. At present, some 
elements in Saudi Arabia and UAE still support the jihad, particularly religious extremist 
elements in the FATA. Post-9/11 actions by the Pakistan government to join the GWOT 
and fight religious extremism have caused the FATA people to mistrust Pakistan and to 
preserve their loyalty to other supporting states. 
France and Morocco have been supporting the Berber cause in Kabylia, including 
the MAK, the organization seeking autonomy from Algeria. France helped create the 
Berber myth and has hosted the MAK. Morocco has supported instability in the Kabylia 
region as a containment policy for the conflict in the Occidental Sahara. The loyalty of 
Berbers to the Algerian state has been further jeopardized by the emergence of AQIM. 
The methods the state has used to combat terrorism have had negative side effects and 
have instigated mistrust among the Kabylia population.  
The presence of outside influences has divided loyalty in both the FATA and 
Kabylia and contributed to their not trusting their respective governments. Outside 
influence by other states, therefore, is a big problem in these areas. International actors 
have created competing loyalties and weakened the legitimacy of federal government, , 
thus helping to create the conditions for terrorist safe havens. 
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